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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
S & F SUPPLY COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; BURGER-IN-THE
ROUND, a Delaware corporation;
ANDREW W. SOUVALL, ROULA P.
SOUVALL, his wife; PETER W.
j
SOUVALL, MARY SOUVALL, his
|
wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
&nd
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, j
Intervening Plaintiff,
vs.
S. CRAIG HUNTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
12686

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS
AND INTERVENING PLAINTIFF

Due to the lapse of some 18 months since the record
on appeal was filed, the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiff applied for permission to file this additional Brief.
However, it is difficult in a fraud case to be "brief" because the facts are complex and require a detailed explanation to enable this court to agree that the trial
judge and jury committed no error. Plaintiffs will continue to designate the Transcript by the numbers placed
at the bottom of the record by the Clerk of the Court,
rather than the reporter's page number at the top, as
appellant has done.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
As set forth in the original Brief of Intervening
Plaintiff-Respondent filed by the United States Attorney's office, this matter originated when the plaintiff
corporations filed bankruptcy in early February of 1970
(Tr. 254) on a $200,000 Small Business Administration
(herein called "SBA") loan, being serviced and participated in 25% by Zions First National Bank (herein
called "Bank"). The SB A and the Bank granted permission to the individual guarantors, Peter and Andy
Souvall, to sell and liquidate the pledged assets in order
to repay the loan, all of which was subject to obtaining
disclaimers from the Bankruptcy Court. Souvalls sold
a restaurant in Provo and another on 4th South in Salt
Lake City, which reduced the loan balance to about
$150,000 when Craig Hunter ("Hunter") approached the
Souvalls on February 15 and said he was interested in
purchasing the 10,000 shares of Universal Leasing stock
which had been pledged by the Souvalls to the Bank together with mortgages on their homes as personal collateral for the corporate loan. There is no dispute in any
of the testimony that Hunter, the buyer, came to the
Souvalls to purchase the stock, because on February 12
he had been invited to a meeting at the Towne House in
Salt Lake City by Jerry Timothy and McKay Smith
where he met Mark Eames and his attorney who told
him: (1) that Universal Leasing had been merged into
Universal Rockwell the previous December; (2) that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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10,000 shares of Universal Leasing stock belonging to
Souvalls now represented 4,530,000 shares of Universal
Rockwell with Mark Eames as president; (3) that
Timothy was going to merge his company, North Star
Marine Sales, with assets of approximately $1,500,000
into Universal Rockwell; (4) that they needed Hunter
in the deal because he had a NSAD broker's license, and
they needed somebody to make a market in the stock and
tell brokers about it (Tr. 605, 606). Eames told Hunter
that Souvalls were in financial trouble and that their
stock would be available for sale (Tr. 607). Eames gave
Hunter two financial statements, one dated 3/31/69 and
one dated 11/30/69 (Tr. 606), and also the subject was
discussed that the Souvall stock could be made free trading stock (Tr. 676), because of a change in circumstances,
and that it could be pegged on the market at 10c a share
(Tr. 710, 755). There was evidence that the jury could
believe that Hunter anticipated selling the 4,530,000
shares for $450,000.
Hunter then went to Souvalls, and they told him to
get any information he wanted, outside of the fact that
they were willing to sell it, from the Bank (Tr. 608).
Throughout the entire trial and in the appellant's original
brief, he did not claim that the Souvalls misled him by
any omissions to state information which they concealed
or withheld.
At this point, it might be well to interject the Pleadings (counterclaim for fraud) filed by Hunter, which

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
alleged that the Souvalls, as sellers of the stock, omitted
to tell Hunter "(a) that Universal Rockwell, Ltd. was in
very serious financial difficulty and (b) that because
of such difficulty the stock of said corporation would
become valueless within a short period of time," constituting a scheme to defraud under 61-1-22(b), U.C.A.
1953 (Tr. 23). The Bank intervened in the case, alleging
that after Hunter signed the agreement of purchase dated
March 9, 1970, he requested the Bank to release the stock
to him on the basis of his promises that he owned New
York stocks and that he would liquidate those stocks to
pay cash, as the agreement required, and further, that
he had executed a promissory note to evidence his purchase plus interest thereon (Tr. 25). To the intervener's
Complaint, Hunter counterclaimed that the Bank knew
that the stock was worthless and knew that the finanncial
statements which the Bank gave him were inaccurate,
misleading and false. Thereafter, the Counterclaim
alleged a cause of action against the Bank for common
law fraud in knowingly, with intent to deceive, delivering
false financial statements of Universal Leasing, with
intent that Hunter be deceived thereby, to his damage
(Tr. 36). However, the Counterclaim never pleaded that
the Bank was the seller of the stock by any theory of
agency, nor was the Bank charged with statutory fraud
under the Securities Act (61-1-22(2); omissions to state
material facts).
The big difference in testimony is that Hunter testified that he left the Souvalls and went to the Bank, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he asked Don Bennett, Commercial Loan Officer, what
information he had on Universal Leasing; that Bennett
gave him a financial statement dated 8/31/69, Ex. 18P
(Tr. 609); that Hunter told Bennett he had two financial
statements already and wanted to compare it to them.
On the face of the statements it appeared that the company was in good shape, and thereafter Hunter and his
attorney, Reed Watkins, proceeded to negotiate the
agreement to purchase the stock and other assets for
$133,500 (Ex. 3P). Before calling upon Hunter as a
witness, counsel for appellant called Don Bennett to the
witness stand. Bennett testified that prior to January
of 1970, Universal Leasing had borrowed funds from
the Bank of Spanish Fork prior to that bank's being
merged into Zions F i r s t National Bank (Tr. 354); that
in December of 1969 or January of 1970 he received some
financial statements of Universal Leasing Corporation
from the Spanish Fork office of the Bank. These statements had never been in possession of the Souvalls, and
they did not know anything about them or their contents.
(Tr. 355). When Mr. Hunter first approached the Bank
he wanted to purchase the loan directly from the Bank;
to buy the loan and the assets and assume the whole obligation (Tr. 370); that he did not recall giving Hunter a
copy of a financial statement (Tr. 366); that he had two
financial statements in his possession with the same
date (Tr. 368). Bennett said that he went to the files and
showed Hunter the latest statements which were both
dated 8/31/69 (Ex. 13P and 14P) (Tr. 373) and explained
that he was not sure which one was right, if either one
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of them were correct, and also that the statements showed
that Universal Leasing Corporation owned 100% of Universal Eockwell, which was converse to what his understanding had been (Tr. 374). The two statements showed
a difference in net worth of approximately $12,000 and
difference in total assets of $800,000 (Tr. 374), and Bennett told Hunter that he was soot sure which one was correct.
On February 27, 1970, Bennett called Mark Eames
on the telephone, who told him that the free trading stock
in Universal Rockwell was trading for $05c a share, and
that the August 31, 1969, statement which was received
from Spanish Fork was apparently incorrectly prepared
and that Eames would send a copy of the 11/30/69
financial statement (Ex. 16P). Bennett testified that at
the time plaintiffs were applying for the SBA loan, Souvalls brought in a letter of John C. Swenson dated May
15, 1969, which stated that Swenson offered to purchase
at any time it was offered for sale the Souvall 10,000
shares of stock in Universal Leasing Corporation at Ten
Dollars per share (Ex. 15P). Other than the Swenson
letter and his conversation with Mr. Eames on 2/27/70,
Bennett had no further information concerning the value
of the Universal Eockwell shares (Tr. 380).
Hunter and his attorney then commenced to negotiate
an agreement for the sale of the stock. He did not ask
for any further information from the Souvalls, or even
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have any discussion as to its inherent value (Tr. 654).
Souvall's attorney explained that there were two major
legal problems involved. First, that the sale agreement
had to be approved by the Bankruptcy Court (Tr. 658),
and second, that this was investment stock. Hunter insisted that before he would make any deal that it be
made free trading stock (Tr. 659). This was accomplished
by Hunter hiring attorney Alex Walker who took extensive affidavits from the Souvalls and the Bank officers, and then advised Mr. Craig Hunter by letter of
all the facts leading up to the SBA loan and that the
business calamity which occurred could not have been reasonably foreseen by the Souvalls or the Bank at the time
the loan was made. His letter (Ex. 32P) concluded by
saying that all of the parties had acted in good faith;
the pledge of the stock was bona fide. The Bank did not
make a cursory examination, nor was it dealing with the
Souvalls for the first time, but was dealing with longestablished customers; that Walker knew that the SBA
makes a very thorough investigation of every applicant
for a loan prior to the time it is approved. "Thus the
conclusion is inescapable that the Souvalls sustained a
change of circumstances with regard to their investment
intent, as that term is known under the Federal Securities
Acts, subsequent to obtaining the loan in question. Thus
the sale by the Souvalls to S. Craig Hunter would not
require registration with theUnited States Securities and
Exchange Commission." Hunter had talked to Mark
Eames prior to the Walker meeting, and he felt that the
Board of Universal Rockwell would free up the stock.
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He also got assurance from Alex Walker, who had discussed the matter with Mr. Cahoon, attorney for Universal Eockwell (Tr. 676).
The merger agreement between North Star Marine
Sales and Universal Rockwell was signed February 16,
1970 (Ex. 27P) and., roughly, this merged fixed assets
owned by North Star Marine of One and One-half Million
Dollars into Universal Eockwell which had a net worth
of $562,000 (Tr. 643) according to its 11/30/69 statement
(Ex. 23D). The North Star Marine assets consisted of
a sailing ship named the "Stella Polaris" valued at $325,000, an airplane valued at $55,000 and stocks and bonds
representing 40,000 acres of land in the middle of Brazil
valued at $1,250,000. See Exhibits 28P and 37P. Throughout his negotiations, Hunter did not tell the Souvalls,
Don Bennett nor John Langeland about the merger between North Star Marine Sales and Universal Eockwell.
Mr. John Langeland testified at the request of counsel for Hunter and stated that he was Senior Vice President at the Bank and had been a director in Dinner Table
(Tr. 433). He had been a one percent owner of stock in
the Dinner Table. The first time he met Hunter in connection with this transaction, Hunter wanted to buy all
of the assets under the loan (Tr. 452). He signed the
agreement that the Bank approved the transaction, but
the Bank was not a party to it (Tr. 454). Mr. Hunter
never asked John Langeland about his knowledge of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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financial condition of Universal Leasing nor anything
about its prospects in business (Tr. 465). Hunter led
Langeland to believe that he had New York securities
which would be adequate to make the purchase of the
Souvall stock (Tr. 465). Langeland assured attorney
Alvin Smith that Hunter would be able to perform because of the assurances Hunter had given that he had
New York stocks (Tr. 471).
As a result of all of his information and discussions,
Hunter, on February 28, 1970, first agreed to pay $150,000 for the equity in the homes of the Souvalls, the Highland Drive location, inventory at 110 West 33rd South,
a 'California conditional sales agreement, and the stock
(Ex. 20D). This agreement was superseded by the final
agreement, signed March 9, 1970, for $133,500, which did
not include the homes. He testified that the only thing
he wanted was the stock (Tr. 748) and that he did not
care whether it was a $150,000 agreement with the homes
going back to Souvalls or whether it was $133,500 without the houses going back (Tr. 748). At the time he
signed his agreement for $133,500, he had an agreement
to sell the Highland Drive location to Ernest Psarras,
who had already made arrangements with the Souvalls
to buy this location for $35,000 (Tr. 611). This money
was paid by Psarras. Also, an additional $18,252,69 was
paid by Hunter by a $9,000 cashiers check and the sale
of inventory items, which total payments of $53,252.69
were credited to the agreement at the Bank (Ex. 10P).
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On May 27, 1970, the merger between Universal
Rockwell Corporation and North Star Marine Sales, Inc.
was rescinded by written agreement (Ex. 29P). Mark
Eames, President of Rockwell, testified that there was
discord between the parties involved (Tr. 573), to-wit.
Eames and Timothy. "What was misrepresented to us
by Mr. Timothy was the fact that there was no cash flow
requirements on our part to service this debt; that this
company of its own could service its own debt cash flow
requirements. We found that after the merger this was
not true." The matter of rescission had been discussed
as early as May 13. Nevertheless, Mr. Hunter was the
power behind Mr. Timothy (Tr. 696) hiring accountant
Robert Apgood, who prepared a financial statement
dated May 27, 1970, which showed total assets of over
Four Million Dollars, including all the assets of North
Star Marine Sales.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT THE BANK WAS THE AGENT
OF THE SELLERS FOR THE GIVING OF INFORMATION.

There was a great preponderance of evidence that
Hunter was an eager, anxious buyer of the stock because
10c a share times 4,530,000 shares equals $453,000. This
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was the prospect that was tendered to him in the Towne
House by Timothy and Eames on February 12, 1970. He
was going to get free trading stock upon which no S.E.C.
registration had been made, nor prospectus issued, and
this talk of a merger was not known by the sellers or the
Bank, but only by him.
The major problem which arose for the plaintiff
and intervening plaintiff was how to present to the court,
instructions to the jury in such a case as this. There
were two separate counterclaims by Hunter; one against
the Souvalls for statutory fraud under 61-1-22(b) and
one for common law fraud against the Bank. The Bank
also claimed that Hunter had defrauded it by obtaining
the shares of stock on March 25 on the basis of his false
statements that he had New York securities and was
about to liquidate them to pay for the Universal Leasing
shares. Because of the Bank's complaint for fraud and
the two separate counterclaims for fraud, the Court
agreed with the plaintiffs to submit the case to the jury
on 25 written interrogatories under Rule 49(a). This
enabled the defendant to squarely argue that if they
found that Don Bennett gave Craig Hunter a false or
misleading financial statement, they cauld so indicate in
answer to Interrogatory Nos. 11,12,13 and 14 (Tr. 186).
By the same short questions the jury found that Craig
Hunter, in order to induce the plaintiffs to sell the stock
and the Bank to approve the sale, made false representations (that he had New York stocks), but that it was
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not made with fraudulent intent as to the Souvalls (Interrogatory No. 7; Tr. 185), but it was to the Bank (Interrogatory No. 8; Tr. 186); that the Bank did not act
with ordinary prudence in relying on the representation
(Interrogatory No. 9; Tr. 186). Thereafter, the jury
found that the plaintiffs did not sell the stock to the defendant by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made not misleading (Interrogatories Nos. 19 and 20; Tr. 187). This is
the language of the statute 61-1-22 (b). The jury was
very knowledgable and able to intelligently answer the
questions put to them. Their answers were a far better
finding of the true facts in the case than any general
verdict.
The appellant argues that the Court should have
instructed the jury under its Bequest at Tr. 147, "that
Zions Bank was the agent of the plaintiffs for the giving
of information about Universal Leasing to the defendant." This request was made as a matter of law, not
an issue of fact. Such a requested instruction is inapplicable to this case because the testimony was that Souvalls
did not know that the Bank had the financial statements
from its Spanish Fork branch office which Bennett discussed with, and pointed out the differences to Craig
Hunter. So the principal should not be liable, if the agent
goes beyond the implied authority to show authorized
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
information which is in the principal's file (Souvall)
and shows something else which the principal is wholly
unaware of. The next point is that the defendant wanted
this submitted on a general verdict where he could argue
everything all together that both the Bank and the plaintiffs were guilty of fraud, if they made a false representation, or if they omitted^ to give material facts. The
Bank was not the seller of the stock, which Hunter well
knew, and if he wanted to bottom his case on something
that the Bank knew and withheld, then the Counterclaim
should have alleged this statutory duty of the Bank to
have complied with 61-1-22 (2).
This is particularly true in this case because the
statute (61-1-22) states at subsection (2):
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller, every person occupying a similar
status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller who materially aids in the
sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and
severally with and to the same extent as the seller,
unless the nonseller who is so liable sustains the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in
exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of the existence of the facts by reason of which
the liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several
persons so liable.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I F the defendant had pleaded the statute, then interrogatories could have been asked of the jury if they believed
that the overall conduct of the Souvalls and the Bank
showed that these parties impliedly consented that the
Bank should act as agent on behalf of the Souvalls and
subject to their control, and that the Bank consented to
so act (Eestatement of Agency, Section 1). An interrogatory could also have been asked if they believed that the
Bank materially aided in the sale.
This switch of theories in the case, after the respondents successfully won a jury trial, gives the appellant
a chance to make a great jury argument to this Court.
But it is clear that the jury chose to believe that Hunter
was a stock promoter who jumped into the picture to
make his fortune on the North Star Marine Sales merger.
There was a nine day trial, and the defendant called two
Bank officers, Don Bennett and John Langeland. Neither
one of them was accused or sharply questioned about
knowing that the financial statement was false or having
information that the Universal Leasing stock was not
worth the value placed on it in the sales agreement. Don
Bennett stated that he discussed the fact that two statements in his file showed a difference in total assets of
$800,000 for the same date (8/31/69) and that he was not
sure which one was right (Tr. 373). He cautioned and
advised Hunter to audit the company himself or obtain
additional financial information on the company (Tr.
375). Throughout the entire record, there is no evidence
that the plaintiffs or the Bank knew more about the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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value of this stock than did Hunter. None of the plaintiffs or the Bank Officers knew of the proposed merger
between Universal Rockwell and North Star Marine
Sales.
The requested instruction that the Bank was the
agent of the Souvalls for the giving of information about
Universal Leasing to the defendants (Tr. 147) would,
under normal legal principles, impute a wrongful act by
Do>n Bennett to the Souvalls, as sellers of the stock. But
appellant's Reply Brief argues the facts as though the
Bank was guilty of omissions under subsection 2 of the
statute. Hunter called an accountant, Robert Apgood, to
testify that he thought the financial statements of 8/31/69
were false and misleading because as far as he was
able to determine no books had been posted for 1969 by
Universal Leasing (Tr. 479). But there was no evidence
that Don Bennett or the Souvalls knew this. The undisputed fact was that during the middle of February,
1970, Eames and Timothy were very optimistic about the
merger between Universal Rockwell and North Star
Marine Sales, and Hunter was meeting quite often with
these principals to the merger. By his own testimony,
Eames gave him two financial statements dated 3/31/69
and 11/30/69. However, the jury chose to believe that
Don Bennett explained the difference between the two
statements dated 8/31/69 to Hunter, and that Hunter
could not claim he was misled, or relied on the 8/31/69
statement. The issues of whether or not the Bank made
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a false representation of a material fact to the defendant
were fairly presented to the jury by Interrogatory Nos.
11 and 12. In Interrogatory No. 13, tht jury was asked,
"Do you find that the representation was known by the
Bank's officers or agents to be false when it was made
or that such statement was made recklessly with knowledge that there was insufficient information upon which
to base such statement?," and the jury answered, "No."
This presented the theory of reckless fraud to the jury
as announced in the cases of Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d
279, 373 P .2d 382, and Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation,
18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P .2d 659, but the jury did not agree
with Hunter's argument in this regard.
The defendant did not plead the statute that the
Bank was the agent of the Souvalls who materially aided
in the sale of the stock. This fact and the evidence that
the Bank gave information which they possessed, but
which Souvalls did not know they had, and the submission of the basic dispute in the two versions of what happened between Bennett and Hunter, makes the ruling of
the trial court entirely proper. It would have been error
to tell the jury as a matter of law that the Bank was the
agent of the Souvalls in view of the two separate Counterclaims on two separate theories.
POINT II
PROPOSED EXHIBIT 7-D WAS PROPERLY
EXCLUDED FROM

EVIDENCE.
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The Trial Court and J u r y could plainly see that the
motive of paying off the loan balance of approximately
$150,000 was important to the plaintiffs, Souvalls, the
Bank and the SBA. But the fact that this motive existed
did not convince the jury that there was any fraud perpetrated upon Mr. Hunter. The SBA loan application
was prepared prior to June 10, 1969.
I t is significant to note that intervening plaintiff at
the trial objected to Exhibit 7-D on the grounds that it
was immaterial and irrelevant for the court to go into
any loan documents that were prepared a year previous
to the agreement between the Souvalls and the defendant
and that to go into everything that was preliminary to
the loan being made would have been going far afield.
In addition to this objection, we now direct this court's
attention to the exhibit itself. I t was merely a work
paper taken from some file. I t is not signed or dated
and relates only to some of the assets which were eventually given as security for the loan. Patently, this is
not the complete and final loan application, and for the
defendant to premise its defense on the failure to admit
this preliminary, incomplete, unsigned document, evidently prepared approximately a year prior to the facts
at issue, is not an error. If defendant's counterclaim
were to be based upon a fraudulent loan application, defendant had ample opportunity to have the plaintiff,
intervening plaintiff or SBA officials produce the final
loan application with all amendments, supporting data,
representations and other documents which were material
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and relevant to the application and the grant of the $200,000 loan. Defendant failed to do this and is now estopped
to justify his failure by claiming he should have been
able to introduce an incomplete document in lieu thereof.
The appellant states that it should have been allowed
to develop evidence about several irregularities in the
SBA loan application.
1. Appellant first claims that there was a failure
to set forth in Item Two of the exhibit the fact that both
Mr. John Langeland and Donald Bennett of the Bank
assisted in the preparation of the loan application. It is
immaterial to the issues of fraud, which allegedly occurred in February of 1970, who prepared the loan application in June of 1969. Elmer Fox & Company, C.P.A.,
and Daynes Business Service prepared the application
as stated at paragraph 2, page 2. Don Bennett testified
that he did not help prepare it or know anyone in the
Bank who did (Tr. 357). Mr. John Langeland also testified that he did not prepare it, but the Bank had the
forms (Tr. 434). Pete Souvall testified at Transcript
301 that he discussed the SBA loan application with
Mr. Langland and Mr. Bennett, and they guided him,
but it is not a fact that they physically assisted in its
preparation. Counsel for the plaintiffs objected on the
grounds of relevancy and materiality to the admission of
the SBA loan application at the time Peter Souvall was
being cross-examined, and the matter was argued in
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chambers (Tr. 301-302). The Trial Court denied its admission and said that the contract of sale from Souvalls
to Hunter dated March 9, 1970, speaks for itself and
that the extraneous matters concerning the alleged application to the SBA nine months previous were not
pertinent or germaine to the issues in this matter (Tr.
303).
2. Answering the claimed irregularity No. 2 that
T. Bowering Woodbury and Mr. John Langeland of the
Bank were officers and directors of the borrowing corporation, Mr. Don Bennett (Tr. 356) and Mr. John
Langeland (Tr. 443) freely admitted that Mr. Woodbury
andn Mr. Langeland were directors of Dinner Table, not
of S & F Supply. What appellant complains of is not
that these facts were withheld from the jury, but that
there was a failure to disclose this directorship in paragraph 3 of the second page of the alleged application.
Mr. Bennett testified that he believed the application
asks for directors or stockholders that own 20 percent
or more of the stock (Tr. 357), but attorney Walter Faber
wanted to pursue the matter that the forms asked for
the names of all directors. The court sustained the objection as to Mr. Bennett answering why Mr. Langeland
and Mr. Woodbury were not listed as directors, because
Don Bennett did not prepare it (Tr. 358). The Bank
has examined its file on this particular loan, and it sent
a letter to the SBA which fully explains that Langeland
and Woodbury were directors and shareholders in the
Dinner Table, but it was not a germaine issue at trial.
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Hunter never looked at the SBA loan application before
buying the stock, and it would have taken another half
a day's time to prove that Daynes Business Service left
these names out of the application, when a separate letter
notified the SBA of such fact.
Irregularity No. 3, as claimed by appellant, is that
there was a failure to disclose the actual use of the loan
proceeds in Item Eight of the application.
One of the major problems about letting the SBA
loan application into evidence is that there was a prior
history of loans between the Bank and the corporate
borrowers. The loan application (Ex. 7D) was prepared
before June 10, 1969, and there was subsequent correspondence about the fact that the Bank's 25% participation in the loan would be represented by a $50,000 debt
which the Borrowers already owed to the Bank. The
original application did mention that an SBA guaranteed
loan of $13,942.21 secured by equipment would be paid
off with the loan proceeds. There was a complete explanation of all the facts to the SBA by the Bank, but it
would have confused the jury and unduly prolonged the
trial to put into evidence the entire SBA loan file. The
explanation about the use of the loan proceeds by Daynes
Business Service was completely irrelevant to the issues
at trial.
The actual use of the proceeds by the plaintiffs
clearly had no bearing on whether plaintiffs or the bank,
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nine months thereafter, were parties to either a statutory
or common law fraud on March 9, 1970. The statement
of the proposed use on the prelimmary document 1-B
has even less bearing.
The appellant's fourth contention is that there was
an improper evaluation of the assets which were pledged
as collateral on the loan. In the first place, this Court
should note that this contention has very little to do with
the admission into evidence of the incomplete application itself. The Bank did not prepare the loan application, and it was not the Bank who made the statements
therein contained. As to the evaluation of the assets,
the Universal Leasing stock in the summer of 1969 was
restricted stock. There was no market in it to give a
market quotation to the SB A, as to its value. The Souvalls obtained a letter from John Swenson, who was one
of the principals in Universal Leasing, dated May 15,
1969, which letter was addressed to the Souvalls and
stated,
"Please be advised this letter is an offer to
purchase, at any time it is offered for sale, your
stock in Universal Leasing Corporation (Five
Thousand Shares Each) 5,000 at Ten Dollars per
share. Yours truly, John C. Swenson"
(Ex. 15P). With this letter admitted into evidence, appellant argued to the jury all the same arguments that
he makes in his Reply Brief to this Court. With
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the Swenson letter admitted into evidence, there was no
materiality of the SB A loan application. The basic facts
were proved by the best evidence rule.
Mr. Langeland testified on his cross-examination that
he had had an inquiry not at the Bank's instigation, but it
came from the Spanish Fork branch, as to what basis Mr.
Swenson down there could purchase the stock of Universal Leasing (Tr. 462, 463). Mr. Langeland told Craig
Hunter about it, and Mr. Hunter said he was acquainted
with Mr. Swenson and that in his opinion Mr. Swenson
had no ability to buy the stock, and he didn't think too
highly of his ability as a businessman either (Tr. 464).
Later, Mr. Langeland stated that to his knowledge Mr.
Swenson did not refuse to purchase the stock at Zions'
request prior to January of 1970 (Tr. 475). Mr. Bennett
testified that the Bank never called upon Mr. Swenson
to buy the stock (Tr. 400), because "at the time that Mr.
Hunter appeared, we no longer gave thought to offering
it to Mr. Swenson. Mr. Hunter was very much, well, he
was very anxious to receive this stock, and he pushed us.
What I mean, he was trying to get this stock out of the
Bankruptcy Court back so that we could sell it to him.
Our attorneys were working on this. He was working
with our attorneys and his attorney on getting a letter
from Watkins (meant Alex Walker). There was a lot
of pressure involved in trying to free up this stock so
that Mr. Hunter could have it. And we had no reason
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
to consider at this time offering it, considering exercising
this letter" (to sell the stock to John Swenson) (emphasis added) (Tr. 412).
The appellant's Reply Brief tries to intimate that
the refusal by the Trial Court to admit the SBA loan
application prevented appellant from proving that there
was something improper about the evaluation of the assets. This is not true. The record is clear about the letter
from John C. Swenson offering to purchase the shares,
which were restricted stock. There is nothing contained
in the SBA loan application which would further assist
the jury in the question as to what further information
the plaintiffs or the Bank had which they failed to reveal
to Hunter.
Respondents therefore answer the summary of the
appellant set forth at pages 15, 16 and 17 of appellant's
Reply Brief as follows:
1. Relationship Between Plaintiffs and Bank Officers. Appellant proved by the direct testimony of the
Bank's officers that T. Bowering Woodbury and John
Langeland were directors of the Dinner Table. The fact
that Daynes Business Service did not list their names
as directors in the SBA loan application is entirely immaterial to Hunter being defrauded. The appellant made
a very strong argument to the jury that this connection
of the Bank and the plaintiffs was the basis for the Bank
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defrauding Hunter, but the jury chose to believe Bennett
that he tried to carefully explain to Hunter that he had
two financial statements, and he didn't know which one
was right; that he pointed out this difference to Hunter,
and he cautioned and advised Hunter to audit the company himself or obtain additional financial information
on the company (Tr. 375). Langeland testified on rebuttal that prior to Hunter signing the final Agreement
for $133,500 on March 9, that Hunter came into his office
with a financial statement in his hand, and he didn't
even sit down, and Langeland said, "Craig, it seems to
me that you ought to do everything you can to verify
that what you are buying has the value that you have
in your mind that you have set on it" (Tr. 849). Hunter
did not take the stand to deny that he had been cautioned
by Bennett and Langeland. The entire weight of the
evidence was that he rushed into the deal in spite of what
Bennett pointed out as two inconsistent financial statements and Langeland's attempt to advise him. Neither
'Bennett nor Langeland knew about the North Star
Marine merger, which motivated Hunter to rush into the
deal.
Hunter expects the Bank, or the jury, or now this
Court to protect him against his own folly. His Reply
Brief never mentions his own knowledge gained from
Timothy and Eames about the merger between Universal
Rockwell and North Star Marine Sales, and his anticipation at pegging the market at 10c per share for 4,530,000
shares. The jury found by its answers to Interrogatories
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Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Tr. 185) that Hunter knowingly made
a false representation of fact to the Bank, to-wit: that
he had New York securities sufficient in amount to pay
cash for his purchase. He was so intent on his scheme
to get stock released without having the cash to pay for
it, that he ignored everything the Bank told him.
2. Scienter. The jury was fully aware that the
money to be paid under the sales agreement (Ex. 3P) was
going to the Bank (25%) and the SBA (75%) to pay
off the loan. The statement in the Reply Brief that because the borrowing corporations had business relationships and adverse financial dealings with Universal Leasing "that those relationships and dealings were the major
factor that caused Universal Leasing to go broke" (page
15) is not supported by the record. Universal Leasing
was merged into Universal Rockwell on November 11,
1969 (Ex. 6P), and the major factor which caused Universal Rockwell to go broke was the recission of its merger with North Star Marine Sales on May 27, 1970 (Ex.
29P).
*
3. Agency. The Reply Brief of Appellant now
argues that the Bank should be treated as a seller of the
stock and should be held liable if it was guilty of omissions to state material facts. The decisive reason for
affirming the jury verdict is that the appellant never
pleaded any theory of statutory fraud against the Bank
under 61-1-22(2).
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4. Intentional Misstatements and Omissions. It is
entirely fallacious to state, as appellant does, that by
exclusion of the SBA loan application he was "prevented
from showing how the individual plaintiffs and the indvidual Bank officers mutually benefitted by their deception" (page 17). Counsel for Mr. Hunter called Peter
Souvall, Don Bennett and John Langeland as his witnesses. Only one fact was elicited which the witnesses
knew about Universal Leasing, yet this fact was already
known by Hunter. When Dinner Table took out bankruptcy, it's own stock became worthless, and Universal
Leasing owned 50,000 shares of stock in Dinner Table.
This appeared as an asset worth $100,000 on the 11/30/69
financial statement given to Hunter by Mark Eames (Tr.
606, Ex. 23D). At that time, Eames told Hunter that
the Dinner Table stock was worthless (Tr. 648), prior to
the final agreement to purchase made by Hunter.
Eames testified that he vaguely recalled the meeting at
the Towne House. He was at that time the President of
Universal Bockwell (on February 12, 1970), and he explained the future plans of the company to Mr. Hunter,
and he testified that he probably explained the position
of the company with optimism (Tr. 827).
POINT III
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTIONS.
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As stated before, the Counterclaim by Hunter against
the Souvalls specifically pleaded that plaintiffs were
guilty of statutory fraud for failing to tell Hunter material facts, "necessary in order to make the statements
made by plaintiff to defendant, in light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading . . ."
(Tr. 56). The Counterclaim against the Bank stated that
it knew that the financial statements which it gave to the
defendant were inaccurate, misleading and false, and
that it gave Hunter the false financial statements with
intent to deceive and defraud him (Tr. 36). After extensive discovery in obtaining an order for production
of documents and taking the deposition of Bennett and
Langeland, plaintiff went to trial, and from the testimony of Bennett (Tr. 354), Pete Souvall (Tr. 415),
Dangeland (Tr. 429), Apgood, the accountant, Eames
(iTr. 569), and Hunter (Tr. 603), the Court and jury
were all led to believe that the theory of the fraud charge
was that Hunter would somehow prove that the Bank
knew that the financial statements were false and that
they gave them to Hunter with an intent to deceive him.
Throughout the trial, the plaintiffs and intervening
plaintiff and the Court were not aware that Hunter's
counsel would take the position that because Souvalls
told Hunter to get what information he wanted from the
Bank, that this made the Bank their agent, and further,
that the agent thereby became bound to act with the
same duty as the principal in the sale of $100,000 worth
of stock. The plaintiff and the Bank are entitled to know
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in a fraud case exactly what it is that they are charged
with. (Eule 9(b), Utah Eules of Civil Procedure.) Thus,
the theory of the trial of this case and the argument
urged to this Court on appeal are two entirely separate
matters. The crucial instruction is defendant's proposed
instruction found at Tr. 147:
" You are instructed that Zions Bank was the agent
of the plaintiffs for the giving of information
about Universal Leasing to the defendant."
Based on the supposition that this instruction should
have been given, the appellant states at page 4 that it
is his position that having shown that Hunter went to
the Bank to get financial statements (when he already
had two of them from Mark Eames) and receiving the
advice he got from Don Bennett about statements which
the Souvalls knew nothing about, that in that capacity,
liability could be found against both the Bank aind the
plaintiff under the cited Utah law, to-wit: the statutory
theory of fraud by omission to state material facts. Appellant has cited no case to sustain his position that under his pleadings herein, any omission by the Bank to
tell Hunter more than it did would be imputed to the
Souvalls, or that because the Bank explained that it had
two financial statements which were different in amount
on the same date, meant that right then and there it had
to tell Hunter about the stock when it was unlisted, had
no market value, and when it mentioned that it had an
inquiry about it from Mr. John Swenson. This legal field

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
of liability for a positive misrepresentation as opposed
to an omission of a material fact is a lawyer's delight.
A party is damned if he tells too much (puffing sales
talk) -or damned if he tells too litttle (61-1-22 (2)). But
it has to be pleaded, with an opportunity to meet such
accusations before the trier of the facts.
The theory of statutory fraud for omissions to state
a material fact applies against a seller, who theoretically
controls the sales price and knows whether the stock is
worth what the buyer is to pay for it. Here the explanation about the two different financial statements does
not make the Bank the seller. It did not set the price.
It did not sit in on any of the sales negotiations. Hunter
knew exactly how Souvalls first wanted a $150,000 deal
with the homes thrown in, and later a deal for $133,500
without the homes. He knew that the Souvalls were
setting the price on the stock and not the Bank, yet the
very first time he came into the Bank, and before he
was shown any financial statements, he wanted to buy
the entire loan and all of the pledged assets. There was
never any proof that the Bank knew the financial statements were false. It is not in the position of warranting
the truthfulness of an unsigned, unaudited financial statement which found its way into its Salt Lake City files.
Langeland explained that the loans which the Bank made
to Universal Leasing from its Spanish Fork office were
on the basis of leases of equipment which were pledged
as collateral, and that the loans were made on the strength
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of the lessee's credit and the collateral pledged, not the
financial condition of Universal Leasing (Tr. 849, 850).
As to the claim of error in the instructions, the Court,
by its Instruction No. 17, stated to the jury what Hunter
claimed in his Counterclaim against the plaintiffs and
further instructed the jury on that portion of the statute
which states that it is unlawful to sell a security by means
of any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading. This instruction was coupled with the written Interrogatories Nos. 17 to 25, which were answered as
follows:
17. Do you find that the plaintiffs made a
representation of a material fact to the defendant, S. Craig Hunter?
Answer: No.
18. Do you find that the representation made
by the plaintiffs was false?
Answer: No.
19. Do you find that the plaintiffs sold the
stock to the defendant by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make
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the statements made in the light of the circumstances under which they were made not misleading?
Answer: No.
20. Do you find that if the plaintiffs made
such untrue statement or omission to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made in the light of the circumstances under which they were made not misleading,
that the buyer did not know of the untruth or
omission?
Answer: No.
21. Do you find that the plaintiffs knew or
should have known that Universal Rockwell, Ltd.
was in very serious financial difficulty in February and March of 1970?
Answer: No.
22. Do you find that the plaintiffs in February and March of 1970 expected the stock of
Universal Rockwell, Ltd. to become valueless
within a short period of time?
Answer: No.
23. Do you find that the defendant agreed
to purchase the stock of Universal Rockwell, Ltd.
as a result of plaintiff's device, scheme and artifice to defraud the defendant?
Answer: No.
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24. Do you find that the plaintiff as seller
of the stock did not know and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known of the
untruth or omission for which they are charged!
Answer: Yes.
25. Do you find that the defendant agreed
to purchase the stock of Universal Rockwell, Ltd.
for reasons and purposes not within the knowledge of plaintiffs?
Answer: Yes.
(Transcript 188)
Under B of Point III of appellant's second brief,
contrary to his first brief, it is claimed that the Souvalls
made omissions of material facts.
Once again appellant is making a jury argument to
this court and is repeating the facts presented by his
counsel to the jury. In spite of this, the jury guided by
Instruction No. 17 (see Intervening Plaintiffs' brief pgs.
20-21), specifically found that the Souvalls (1) did not
omit to state a material fact, Interrogatories 19 and 20;
(2) did not know or should not have known that Universal
Rockwell was in a very serious financial difficulty, Interrogatory 21; (3) did not know and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known of the omission
for which they were charged, Interrogatory 24.
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To the contrary, the jury found that Hunter purchased the stock for reasons and purposes not within the
knowledge of the Souvalls, Interrogatory 25.
The jury observed the conduct of the witnesses on
the stand and could see that Hunter had made his decision to purchase the stock due to the facts given to Hunter by Mark Eames. These two men now showed an
animosity toward each other and had been fighting most
of the way (Tr. 792). Mr. Eames' testimony convinced
the jury that he withheld facts from every one for his
personal benefit, that he would lie, perjure and stoop to
any scheme to make a dollar. He was the one who induced
Hunter to join him, the Timothys and McKay Smith in
a con game; he gave Hunter two financial statements,
Exhibits 22D and 23D, and furnished to management two
others, Exhibits 13 and 14, that were in the Bank's file,
having been given to Spanish Fork Branch by Swenson
and then transmitted to Bennett. Hunter had three statemets in his possession to study, and presumably the other
two were brought to his attention. The Souvalls, according to the undisputed evidence, had actual knowledge
of only the March 31, 1969 certified audit. Nevertheless,
appellant argues vehemently that plaintiff, Peter Souvall, is charged with knowledge on February, 1970, of
all the falsities of these statements put out by Eames because Souvall was a director of Universal Leasing during
the period covered by the statements. In other words,
appellant's counsel claims a director, not active in management, having no knowledge of the status of the com-
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pany's accounting records, is charged with a breach of
omission of a fiduciary duty, because the president
puts out false statements which came into the hands of
a prospective buyer of the company's stock, all of which
is unknown to the director. We know of no law charging
a director or seller with the penalties of statutory omission under such a set of facts. The jury found the Souvalls not chargeable with such omissions, nor does the
law, as will be submitted shortly.
Under this point, relating to omission by the plaintiff, appellant cites the relevancy of the financial statements. Two days of the trial were devoted to bringing
them to the attention of the jury. A fair summary of
this evidence and testimony is as follows :
Other than the certified statement dated March 31,
1969, they were all based on estimates and figures that
Eames told his bookkeeper to show, and were devised
according to whatever use Eames chose to make of them.
This is indicated by comparing the net worth as shown
on the five statements, as well as the statement later prepared by CPA Apgood.
Exhibit
22D
13P
14P
18P
23D
24D

Date
3/31/69
8/31/69
8/31/69
8/31/69
11/30/69
3/31/70

Amount
$391,000
702,000
714,000
614,000
562,000
1,659,000

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
Appellant's three attorneys have argued, and now
want this Court to believe that a prospective buyer who
is a college graduate in business administration, who
studied law for two years, was a broker and stock salesman with an NASD license and a partner in a successful
insurance firm, when given copies of or shown such
financial statements was defrauded by a seller because
(1) that seller as a director is charged with their falsity,
even though he did not know they existed, and (2) that
his companies had had some dealings with the corporation, and as a result thereof, the latter's income had sufu
fered.
A buyer of Hunter's sophistication should have been
put on notice by a cursory examination of the statements
submitted to him that they were wildly inconsistent and
should not now complain or assert that the omissions
charged to Souvall would have been sufficient to present
him from going forward with the March purchase.
The jury in determining who was the "defrauder" and
who was the "defraudee" had the opportunity of listening to the testimony of the principal witnesses, Peter
Souvall, Craig Hunter, Mark Eames and Robert Apgood.
We believe the members of the jury were impressed by
which witnesses were forthright and divulged all facts
in their dealings, and, as a result of listening to the prolonged analysis of certain financial records, became convinced that Hunter, Eames and Apgood knew far more
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about Universal Rockwell than plaintiffs and put out
statements which proved to have glaring omissions,
whereas Souvall made no representations and was guilty
of withholding nothing.
As support for this conclusion, we direct the Court's
attention to certain facts brought out by the exhibits
introduced:
-(a) Income. Hunter testified that he was interested
in income and assets. Assuming such a rash conclusion
is true, the exhibits show the income figures as follows:
Exhibit
22P
13P
14P
18P
23D
24D

3/31/69
4/ 1/69
4/ 1/69
4/ 1/69
4/ 1/69
4/ 1/69

Period
to 8/31/69
to 8/31/69
to 8/31/69
to 11/30/69
to 3/31/70

Source

Amount

Barnes
In Bennett's file
In Bennett's file
*
Eames
Apgood

$37,303
47,629
59,627
59,627
7,268
net loss
($126,188)

( # Hunter claims Bennett gave him this.)
The certified statement showed net income of $37,303
for the full prior year (Ex. 22P) By November, 1969,
six months' earnings had gone down to $7,268; the full
year's loss was $126,188. We pose the question, did Mr.
Hunter rely on any of the financial statements, or was
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he taking the word of Eames and Timothy as to what
, could be done? The jury supplied the answer to this
question.
(b) Assets. Some emphasis has been placed upon
Souvall's failure to disclose to Hunter concerning certain
transactions involving Dinner Table and Universal Leasing and the effect these transactions had on the value of
the stock he was acquiring. First of all, he certainly
knew about the bankruptcy of Dinner Table and the fact
that the $100,000 valuation placed upon the stock of
Dinner Table had to be wiped out. The $50,000 transaction involving the California franchise was known to
Hunter from the last page of the Elmer Fox statement
(Ex. 22P) and was not a matter of concern. Of more
importance, after the February meeting with Eames,
Timothy, Smith and Oahoon, Hunter knew about all of
the additional assets which were part of the merger between Universal Rockwell and Timothy's corporations,
by virtue of which the corporate assets had increased,
according to Apgood's book figures, by over One Million
Dollars. Two net assets which Hunter claimed were only
"sugar on the cake" (Tr. 650) appeared on Apgood's
statement of March 31, 1970, but by May 30, 1970, according to the minutes of the corporation (Ex. 30P),
had all evaporated. Thus, the stock in Mr. G's Gas and
Goods, carried at a value of $150,000, which Apgood in a
note stated, "It is the company's opinion that this valuation is materially understated," was returned to Mr.
Swenson by board action because the banks were about
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to foreclose on the corporation, and Mr. Swenson agreed
to take the stations and franchises and to assume the
liabilities in connection therewith; Apgood still carried
Dinner Table Stock at $100,000, although by this date the
corporation had been adjudicated a bankrupt; the ship
($325,000) and Brazilian land ($1,250,000) were lost to
the company as a result of the rescission. (See Ex.
29P.) Hunter, however, in possession of Apgood's report, knowing of the loss to the corporation and the reduction in the corporate assets as outlined above in the
total amount of $1,750,000, had no compunction in offering to sell about one-half of the stock he had purloined
from the Bank to any buyer who would give him $65,000
(Tr. 704 and Ex. 35P). Again, we ask, who was the "defrauder," and who was the "defraudee," Another answer
to this question might be found from the following testimony of Mr. Hunter. He admitted that he had to get a
block of free trading stock to, "Make money. It was my
only incentive" (Tr. (328).
The Utah securities fraud statute is copied from
Eule X 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission
issued pursuant to Section 10(b) of 15 U.S.C., §78j(b)
(17 C.F.E., 240.10b-5). The federal cases construing this
Eule have said :
These quoted words as they appear in the statute
can only mean that Congress forbid not only the
telling of purposeful falsity but also the telling of
half-truths and the failure to tell the "whole
truth." (Hughes v. S.E.C., 174 F .2d at 976.)
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.. In KoMer v. KoMer Co., 319 F.2d 634, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals stated as follows:
It is clear that the statute was intended to
create a form of fiduciary relationship between
so-called corporate "insiders" and "outsiders"
with whom they deal in company securities which
places upon the insider duties more exacting than
mere abstention from what generally is thought
to be fraudulent practices. If so, the question
arises: What are the limits of those duties! We
are satisfied that the answer cannot be confined
to an abstract rule but must be fashioned case by
case as particular facts dictate.
Of course general principles, implicit in the
statute and the rule and elucidated by decisions,
are helpful and may be utilized.
[4] We think Judge Leahy in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-829 (D.C.Del.
1951), stated the general principles that are applicable in terms upon which we cannot improve:
"It is unlawful for an insider, such as a
majority stockholder, to purchase the stock
of minority stockholders without disclosing
material facts affecting the value of the stock,
known to the majority stockholder by virute
of his inside position but not known to the
selling minority stockholders, which information would have affected the judgment of the
sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from
the necessity of preventing a corporate in-
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sider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority
stockholders. It is an attempt to provide
some degree of equalization of bargaining
position in order that the minority may exercise an informed judgment in any such transaction. Some courts have called this a fiduciary duty while others state it is a duty imposed by the "special circumstances." One
of the primary purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et
seq., was to outlaw the use of inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own financial advantage to
the detriment of uninformed public security
holder's."

The statute and the rule basically call for
fair play and abstention on the part of the corporate insider from taking unfair advantage of
the uninformed outsider or minority stockholder.
Such a standard requires the insider to exercise
reasonable and due diligence not only in ascertaining what is material as of the time of the
transaction but in disclosing fully those material
facts about which the outsider is presumably uninformed and which would, in reasonable anticipation, affect his judgment.
See also Myzel v. Fields, 8th C.C.A. 386 F2d at page 733.
The evidence is clear that the Souvalls were not directors
of Universal Eockwell in February of 1970, nor did any
bank officers hold the position of an insider, with superior knowledge of the financial affairs of Universal
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In Kohler v, Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals stated as follows:
It is clear that the statute was intended to
create a form of fiduciary relationship between
so-called corporate "insiders" and "outsiders"
with whom they deal in company securities which
places upon the insider duties more exacting than
mere abstention from what generally is thought
to be fraudulent practices. If so, the question
arises: What are the limits of those duties? We
are satisfied that the answer cannot be confined
to an abstract rule but must be fashioned case by
case as particular facts dictate.
Of course general principles, implicit in the
statute and the rule and elucidated by decisions,
are helpful and may be utilized.
[4] We think Judge Leahy in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-829 (D.C.Del.
1951), stated the general principles that are applicable in terms upon which we cannot improve:
"It is unlawful for an insider, such as a
majority stockholder, to purchase the stock
of minority stockholders without disclosing
material facts affecting the value of the stock,
known to the majority stockholder by virute
of his inside position but not known to the
selling minority stockholders, which information would have affected the judgment of the
sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from
the necessity of preventing a corporate in-
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sider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority
stockholders. It is an attempt to provide
some degree of equalization of bargaining
position in order that the minority may exercise an informed judgment in any such transaction. Some courts have called this a fiduciary duty while others state it is a duty imposed by the "special circumstances." One
of the primary purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et
seq., was to outlaw the use of inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own financial advantage to
the detriment of uninformed public security
holders.''

The statute and the rule basically call for
fair play and abstention on the part of the corporate insider from taking unfair advantage of
the uninformed outsider or minority stockholder.
Such a standard requires the insider to exercise
reasonable and due diligence not only in ascertaining what is material as of the time of the
transaction but in disclosing fully those material
facts about which the outsider is presumably uninformed and which would, in reasonable anticipation, affect his judgment.
See also Myzel v. Fields, 8th C.C.A. 386 F2d at page 733.
The evidence is clear that the Souvalls were not directors
of Universal Rockwell in February of 1970, nor did any
bank officers hold the position of an insider, with superior knowledge of the financial affairs of Universal
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Rockwell. Hunter, after learning of the proposed merger
between Rockwell and North Star Marine Sales, had
greater inside information than the Souvalls or the Bank.
Hunter was given an 11/30/69 financial statement by
Eames which is three months fresher in date than the
two inconsistent statements which Bennett pointed out
to him. Under these facts, there is no blanket duty on
the part of the Souvalls, as sellers of the stock, to tell
everything that they knew about the past history of
Universal Leasing, the predecessor of Universal Rockwell. (See Loss, Securities Regulation, 2nd Ed., Vol III,
pages 1448 et seq.)
The Utah statute itself (61-1-22 (b) makes it clear
that liability only attaches in the case of (1) any untrue
statement of a material fact, or (2) any omission to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made in the light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the
untruth or omission). The Reply Brief does not point to
any question which Hunter asked the Souvalls or the
Bank about a material fact which questions were answered untruthfully, or which there was an omission to state
a material fact NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAKE
THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE LIGHT OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THEY
ARE MADE NOT MISLEADING. The jury found
specifically that the Souvalls did not do this; that they
did not know that Universal Rockwell was in very serious
financial difficulty in February and March of 1970; that
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the defendant did not agree to purchase the stock of Universal Eockwell, Ltd. as a result of plaintiff's device
scheme and artifice to defraud. Appellant is now making
a jury argument to this Court, but the jury could see
that it was Hunter who was the stock promoter; that
Hunter lied to the Bank about having New York securities ; that Hunter rushed headlong into the deal because
of his superior knowledge about a merger of North Star
Marine Sales ($1,500,000) and Universal Eockwell with
a shareholder's equity of $561,759.64, according to the
November statement given him by Mr. Eames (Ex. 23D).
POINT IV

THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS PROPERLY
EXPLAINED TO THE JURY.
In its Special Interrogatories, the Court told the
jury that the burden was upon the plaintiffs and the
intervenor to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that Hunter had defrauded the Bank in obtaining the
shares of stock without paying cash (Tr. 186). As to
the defendant's defense of common law fraud allegedly
perpetrated by the Bank upon Hunter, this was likewise placed upon the defendant to prove each of the
interrogatories by clear and convincing evidence. This
is the rule in Utah in fraud cases. Perry v. Mconkie et.
al., 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P.2d 852; Pace et al. v. Parrish,
122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273; Shaw v. Abraham, 12 Utah
2d 150, 364 P.2d 7; Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America,
17 Utah 2d 112, 405 P.2d 339.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43
However, the statute (61-1-22(b) merely speaks in
terms of the buyer of the securities sustaining "the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth
or omission." For this reason, the special interrogatories
did not require Hunter to prove a violation of the statute
by clear and convincing evidence. The court in its general
instruction No. 6 (Tr. 156) gave J.LF.IT. No. 2.1, that
burden of proof means a preponderance of the evidence.
However, the interrogatories concerning statutory fraud
merely asked the questions without telling the jury what
the burden of proof was (Tr. 188). This was perfectly
fair to the appellant.
The appellant complains in his brief that there were
numerous errors in the instructions Nos. 5 and 6, but
no exceptions were taken to these instructions (Tr. 1034).
The defendant must be bound by the confusion which
he himself created by pleading and testifying that the
Bank deceived him by giving him a false financial statement, and that the Souvalls omitted to tell him material
facts necessary under the circumstances. This theory of
commission by the Bank and omission by the Souvalls is
readily apparent from reading the direct examination of
the witnesses called by the appellant. I t was not until
after the case was completely closed and all parties had
rested (Tr. 901) that counsel for appellant in chambers
began to argue that under Eule 15(b) of the Utah Eules
of Civil Procedure " . . . that if there is a deficiency in
our pleadings . . . when issues not raised by the pleadings
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are tried by express or implied consent of the parties
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
in the pleadings" (Tr. 957). Counsel for the Souvalls
and the Bank objected that no theory of agency had been
tried with their express or implied consent. So in the
light of the evidence that Hunter claimed he was defrauded by the Bank giving him a false financial statement, but the Souvalls were guilty of omissions (they
did not discuss the stocks' inherent value at all), there
had to be special written interrogatories to sort out the
truth of each charge of fraud. It would have been reversible prejudieal error to instruct the jury AS A MATTEE OF LAW, as Hunter requested, that the Bank was
the agent of the Souvalls, and therefore the Bank was
also charged with the duty of stating all material facts
known to it NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAKE THE
STATEMENTS MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THEY ARE
MADE NOT MISLEADING. The instructions were
eminently fair and when considered as a whole clearly
defined the issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence. The answers to the interrogatories were entirely
consistent, and the jury's answers did not indicate any
confusion or lack of understanding as to whom they chose
to believe.
In the light of all circumstances, in view of the detailed instructions concerning representations and omissions, plus the jury's answers to the specific questions,
there was no error.
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POINT V
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN DISMISSING DEPENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS.

This argument has been covered in the previous
briefs. We can only refer the court to the evidence. Defendant failed to introduce one bit of evidence that he
paid any amount to the bank from his own resources.
To the contrary, every cent resulted from sales of stock
or inventory.
We fail to see how Hunter was damaged either under
a rescission theory or a damage theory when he did not
prove that he had paid more than he had received on the
sale of the stock. There was no dispute that he had received in cash the following amounts that he could remember:
Buyer

Atkinson ........
Reid
Steeley
Ford
Brockbank ....

Shares

Price

Amount

25,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
5,000

$.10

$2500

$.10

1000

$.10

1000

$.10

1000

$.10

500

Transaction

789
801
801
801
802

Brinton gave him $6,000 and Hunter gave him 450,000
shares of stock (Tr. 810).
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In addition, Hunter turned over 500,000 shares to
Eames for $10,000, an air-conditioner and computer floor
(Tr. 790).
With this evidence in mind, the Trial judge had no
alternative but to rule that defendant's counterclaims
should not be submitted to the jury because Hunter adduced no evidence of damages. Also, the jury answered
the interrogatories that no fraud whatsoever was perpetrated upon Hunter. This point is moot.

CONCLUSION
After re-reading the 849 pages of the Transcript,
respondent's counsel realize that it is impossible to
dearly present all of the facts to this Court about the
inter-dealings between Hunter, Eames and Timothy.
However, we repeat that the great weight of the testimony
was that Hunter was motivated in buying the stock because of the merger of North Star Marine Sales, and this
was a promoter's scheme to show $2,000,000 worth of
assets on a new financial statement so that the Universal
Rockwell shares could be pegged at 10c a share. The net
effect of all the cross-examination is that Hunter admitted this to be true. The merger was rescinded be-
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tween Eames and Timothy, because of their own misrepresentations to each other, and Hunter was left in
the lurch with trying to sell his stock.
Neither the original Brief wor the Reply Brief of
the appellant mentions or admits to any of the evidence
concerning the merger between North Star Marine Sales
and Universal RochwelL This was the critidal fact upon
which the jury found against him. The appellant does
not argue that the evidence is insufficient for the jury
to have answered the written interrogatories in the manner in which they did. There were 25 answers given which
were entirely consistent as to the jury's determination
concerning who was the defrauder and who was the defraudee.
Appellant was not denied the opportunity to prove
the allegations which he continues to make, so irresponsibly. He now wishes that he had tried the case on a
different theory, one of statutory fraud against the
Bank, and that there was an evil conspiracy between the
Souvalls and the Bank to defraud him. His counsel never
did ask questions such as these. All of these second
thoughts about how his first counsel tried the case are
a defensive mechanism to forgetting about how at the
time of his rash purchase he thought he could obtain the
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Souvall shares on credit and sell the new Universal
Rockwell shares for $453,000.
In the final analysis, fraud is a question of fact, and
this case was fairly presented to the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
Alvin I. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Richard H. Neheker
Attorney for Intervening Plaintiff
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